

Nietzsche and The Women's Question (BGE 231-238)

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In recent years Nietzsche scholarship has witnessed an unusual development: the appearance of studies that want to recruit him for feminism. Informed less by a thorough knowledge of Nietzsche than by the exegetical legerdemain of French critics, these feminist Nietzscheans have sought to overturn the judgment of several generations of scholarship. They are fighting an uphill battle. Even those who have scant acquaintance with Nietzsche's views know that the most notorious comments he made about women were hardly flattering. In this regard perhaps the most frequently cited remark in Nietzsche's oeuvre occurs in the first part of *Zarathustra*, where the reader encounters the following shocking piece of advice: "You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!" (Z 179).ⁱ Our first response is probably to consider this statement a call for the subjugation of women, suggesting actions ranging from taming and training, to physical abuse or the infliction of punishment. Even if we follow the "gentle" Nietzschean line of thought and interpret the "whip" in a metaphorical sense, the citation still advocates attitudes antithetical to our sensibilities. Complicating the most obvious interpretation, however, is the fact that this outburst does not belong to Zarathustra, Nietzsche's mouthpiece in this work, but to a little old woman whom he meets. This is the "little truth" that she gives to Zarathustra about her own sex.ⁱⁱ But Zarathustra's comments on women are hardly more complimentary. In the section "On Little Old and Young Woman," in which the citation about the whip occurs, he also makes assertions that belong to the traditional canon of misogyny. He maintains, for example, that "everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: that is pregnancy"; he insists that "man should be educated for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior; all else is folly." (Z 178). And a bit further on he comments tersely: "The happiness of man is: I will. The happiness of woman is: he wills" (Z 178-79). Not only have such statements, until recently, been admonished by feminists of the twentieth century; they also offended the liberal sentiments of the nineteenth century, including the not inconsiderable women's movement of Nietzsche's own day. Although several women from the early twentieth century overlooked Nietzsche's misogynist utterances in order to laud his

opposition to bourgeois morality and religion,ⁱⁱⁱ historically most women have been wary of considering Nietzsche a friend to women's causes.

There are thus two questions that beg for answers. The first is why have critics sought to make Nietzsche a proto-feminist? The answer is no doubt complex, but I believe that Nietzsche's chicness explains a great deal about the current attempts to square a circle. As the various celebratory conferences commemorating the centennial of Nietzsche's death demonstrate, he continues to enjoy a high regard in academic circles; indeed, in many of the most prestigious theoretical discussions he has remained the center of attention. The general notion that Nietzsche's message is emancipatory and his obvious superiority as a stylist and rhetorician have contributed to the urgency to claim Nietzsche for the feminist camp. The second question is how have critics managed to demonstrate Nietzsche's pro-feminist credentials in light of his disparaging remarks on women? Here again the answer is complex, and in order not to risk abandoning my readers to the dizzying heights of quasi-philosophical reflection, I shall summarize briefly the two most common approaches. The first involves philosophical contextualization to the point of undecidability. The pro-feminist Nietzschean simply points out that in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy terms that are usually derogatory (such as deception, falsehood, or lying) are not necessarily negatives, while traditionally complimentary notions (such as truth, justice, and knowledge) are not always positives. Although Nietzsche most frequently describes women with stereotypically negative attributes, we cannot really be certain that these descriptions do not have a more positive meaning in Nietzsche's thought. Eventually the feminist Nietzschean produces a whole range of potentially radical images of women disclosed by Nietzsche's texts, and we are told that Nietzsche is only apparently misogynist; at a "deeper" level he is expressing profound truths about woman as "the other." The second strategy takes concrete statements from Nietzsche and argues that to be consistent with his own philosophy he cannot be misogynist. For example, Nietzsche's critique of binary pairs as a metaphysical hoax is enlisted to demonstrate that he cannot logically maintain the opposition between man and woman. In order to make Nietzsche agree with positions he embraces in discussions of epistemology or ethics, he must go beyond the facile positions he apparently propounds with regard to the role of women. As one such advocate writes, "Nietzsche was not

philosophically entitled^{iv} to hold misogynist views of women. Supplementing these two strategies is a tactic of abstraction that removes Nietzsche's remarks from the world of real women and re-situates them in a "philosophical realm." Nietzsche, we read repeatedly, was concerned not with empirical reality, but with the "metaphor" or "figure" of women/mother/the female/the feminine. We would be crude theorists indeed if we were to take his remarks as literal statements or injunctions.

I propose that to be crude for the much of the remainder of this essay. My view is that when Nietzsche wrote about women, women's emancipation, and women's rights, he was not speculating in some ethereal realm in which truth and fiction, black and white, and man and woman are obscure and undecideable, but rather in the context of nineteenth-century Europe. I suggest that for Nietzsche, just as for us, questions concerning the relations between the sexes and the role of women in the social order are connected with a definite historical time and a specific biographical context.

In interpreting the remarks of a philosopher (and this is perhaps especially true for Nietzsche) we too often ignore historical and biographical context in favor of a timeless realm of ideas or a relationship to other thinkers in a constructed tradition. We know that Nietzsche himself disapproved of such interpretive practices, and we do him a disservice by not listening more carefully to what really moved him. While we can gain some limited knowledge from abstract procedures, it is my contention that authentic knowledge is always historical knowledge, and that the abstraction from history and biography takes us away from genuine understanding as often as it assists us. We can conceive of and make use of Nietzsche's remarks on women in many ways: the "philosophical" alternatives I outlined can produce results that may be relevant to us or beneficial for us. And it is certainly possible that they could prove more fruitful than a historical understanding, depending, of course, on what kind of fruit you prefer. But if we are going to comprehend Nietzsche's perspective on these matters and understand his controversial remarks on the women's question, then, following Nietzsche's own lead, we should begin with the field of discourse in which they originated and the context in which he himself produced them.

Now defining context is a potentially infinite project since there are always more elements one could consider and additional details one could add. Since both my time and my reader's patience are by contrast limited (and I'm hoping that the latter doesn't run out before the former) I would like to

delineate for you the three most important elements of this context for Nietzsche. The first is the social context of Nietzsche's remarks and involves the growing women's movement of his time. I believe scholarship on the women's movement is fairly unanimous in its verdict that the first wave of activity in Germany is a phenomenon occurring during the last third of the nineteenth century. There were, of course, important precursors to the first wave, notably in the wake of the French Revolution and in the German *Vormärz* (the period between 1840 and 1848). But if we are looking for the beginning of organized and consistent efforts to improve the legal, political, and social lot of women, we will be dealing with a date somewhere around the time Nietzsche began his studies in Bonn in 1864. Indeed, it is significant that Nietzsche's mature life and the development of the women's movement are coterminous events. Unlike earlier philosophers who commented on women—from Plato to Schopenhauer—Nietzsche's remarks were always penned in the context of an actual social movement.

The women's movement of the nineteenth century, of course, was hardly a unity; nor did it have a single goal or objective. The socialist women's movement was more concerned with the working conditions of women, with labor practices, and wage rates. The bourgeois women's movement, on the other hand, had various branches, dealing with issues from motherhood to suffrage. It is unlikely that Nietzsche took note of the breadth and diversity of women's demands. He was obviously unfamiliar with the socialist women's movement and generally ignorant of the main writings of the leaders of the German socialist movement—frequent remarks in his writings indicate that he believed Eugen Dühring was the central theoretician of socialist thought. But we do have evidence that he was acquainted with August Bebel's writings on women, specifically the book *Die Frau in der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft* (*Woman in the Past, Present, and Future*), which was an early version of the extremely popular title, *Die Frau und der Sozialismus* (*Woman and Socialism*).⁹ Otherwise, there is no indication that Nietzsche had any more interest in the problems of working women than he had for the problems of the working class in general.

The bourgeois women's movement played a larger role in Nietzsche's life, in particular the discussion of women and education, which, along with marriage, divorce, and other legal issues, was a point of contestation. With regard to higher education, which was Nietzsche's particular preoccupation

since his own entrance to university studies, it is noteworthy that in Switzerland, where Nietzsche taught and lived for much of the last twenty years of his sane existence, he was confronted directly with emancipatory tendencies. At the time of his tenure in Basel, Swiss universities were in the forefront of the European movement for women's integration into higher education. Although the United States seems to have taken the lead in both the matriculation of womenCOberlin College admitted both women and African Americans from its inception in 1833^{vi} and in the establishment of women's institutions of higher educationCfor example the women's medical colleges established in Philadelphia and Boston in 1850 and 1856Cin Western Europe women's admission to a formerly male bastion began to become a reality with increasing frequency during the last four decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning with France in 1863, which matriculated women in all fields except theology, the barriers prohibiting women from higher education gradually fell across the continent: in Switzerland in 1864, in Sweden, Denmark, England, Italy, and the Netherlands, in the 1870s, and in Norway in the 1880s; in Germany women were not officially admitted to university studies until 1908, although women did attend courses as auditors and petitioned to take examinations in various disciplines before that time. The important point here, however, is that this central issue of the women's movement touched Nietzsche's life in a very palpable fashion. Although Basel was the most conservative Swiss university with regard to admitting womenCthe first woman student was admitted only in 1890Che had to be aware of the fact that women were either being educated or demanding education in neighboring schools. Indeed, in 1875 Nietzsche voted on the side of those who wanted to permit a woman to pursue her examinations at Basel, but the petition was turned down by a vote of six to four, Jacob Burckhardt being among those who voted with the majority.^{vii}

Perhaps more important is that women he knew personally were pioneers in breaking the gender barrier in higher education. The best known of these women is Lou Salomé, who arrived in Zurich in the fall of 1880 and audited courses in theology and philosophy at the University of Zurich during both the winter semester 1880-1881 and the summer semester of 1881. Although she was never officially matriculated, she is illustrative of the scores of Russian women who flocked to Zurich during the 1870s and 1880s to receive an education. Salomé, whose intelligence is beyond question, but whose relationship to the cause of women's emancipation is open to considerable debate, was

not an isolated example of an academic woman in Nietzsche's life. Meta von Salis-Marschlins, who befriended Nietzsche during the 1880s and remained a staunch supporter of the Nietzsche archives long after her friend had lost his sanity, was the first Swiss woman to receive a doctorate. She too studied at Zurich, although in 1885, probably inspired by her friend Nietzsche, she petitioned the faculty at Basel unsuccessfully for permission to matriculate there and continue her studies under Jacob Burckhardt. (Burckhardt evidently voted in the minority on this petition.) In contrast to Salomé, Salis has strong and unambiguous feminist credentials. In fact, she confessed to Nietzsche that the title of doctor did not mean very much to her personally, but "in the interest of the women's question" she did not want to leave the university without having obtained it.^{viii} (Janz III: 305).

One other woman Nietzsche knew indicates that issues of women's emancipation could not have been completely foreign to him. Helene Druskowitz,^{ix} whom Nietzsche met in 1884, was a precocious and ambitious student, whose fate is perhaps symbolic for the plight of women intellectuals in the late nineteenth century. Born in 1856 in Vienna, she completed her *Abitur* in 1873 and achieved a doctorate in Zurich—she was only the second woman to receive a doctorate from the first section of the philosophical faculty—at the age of twenty-two in 1878 with a dissertation on Byron's *Don Juan*. Like many of the women intellectuals of her time, Druskowitz became increasingly interested in the women's movement and increasingly impatient with a male world that denied women the equality they merited. Following her university studies she held lectures in Vienna, Munich, Zurich, Basel, then traveled to North Africa, France, Italy, and Spain before returning to Vienna. There she lived as a freelance writer, employing a variety of pseudonyms and producing plays, translations, and essays. By 1884, she had shifted her focus from the male literary world of England to its women authors, publishing a book on *Three English Writers*, the dramatist Joanna Baillie, the lyricist Elizabeth Barrett-Browning, and the novelist George Eliot. She was introduced to Nietzsche, as most emancipated women were, through the circle around Malwida von Meysenbug, and he was initially impressed with her intellect and writing, that is, as long as she expressed unwavering admiration for his philosophy. Writing to his sister Elisabeth in October of 1884, Nietzsche speaks of his long walks with his new friend Helene Druskowitz, her familiarity with his works, as well as his knowledge of hers (SB 6: 548). She is one of the few people to whom he sends

a copy of the fourth book of *Zarathustra*, which was privately printed, and at one point he expresses the desire to have his works appear in the same publishing house as hers.

But the mutual admiration between the two volatile thinkers did not last very long. By the end of 1884 Druskowitz had already confided in a letter to Conrad Ferdinand Meyer that her enthusiasm for Nietzsche's philosophy was only a "passion du moment," and that she considers his treatment of serious philosophical questions "superficial." Nietzsche appears to have known nothing of her change of heart, at least initially, since he asks Köselitz at the beginning of August to send a copy of *Zarathustra* to her Vienna address. When the book was returned shortly thereafter, obviously with a letter from Druskowitz that left Nietzsche quite shaken, he recognized the rupture in their short-lived relationship. In his collected correspondence we find only a draft of a response, in which he refers to the "honest, albeit not exactly kind and insightful, and not especially 'modest' letter" that she had written (SB 7: 84). Shortly thereafter he writes Köselitz that sending *Zarathustra* to "Fräulein Druscowicz" was a stupidity on his part (SB 7: 86).^x As Druskowitz moved closer to feminist and philosophical concerns, she grew even more critical of Nietzsche. When she dared to denounce him in one of her published writings, Nietzsche completely rejected her, protesting emphatically to Carl Spitteler that "the little literature-goose Druskowitz is anything but my 'pupil'" (SB 8: 159). Approximately two years after Nietzsche's mental collapse, Druskowitz was herself forced into a mental institution in Dresden, and she remained institutionalized until her death in 1918. But she continued with a wide range of activities, composing dramas and a variety of feminist writings, and even helping to found the women's revues *The Holy Struggle (Der heilige Kampf)* and *The Call to Feud (Der Fehderuf)*. Among her literary remains is the polemical pamphlet, *Der Mann als logische und sittliche Unmöglichkeit und als Fluch der Welt: Pessimistische Kardinalsätze (The Male as Logical and Moral Impossibility and Curse of the World)*, in which she rails against religion, marriage, at times Nietzsche's philosophy, and above all men. Let me cite from this text briefly to give you an idea of its tone:

Seiner Beschaffenheit zufolge ist der Mann seiner Gefährtin unwürdig, ein Ehehindernis und nicht ein Bindeglied. Er paßt überhaupt nicht in den Rahmen der

vernunftbegabten Welt. Denn er ist zu roh und lügnerisch, sein Denken zu lückenhaft und weitschweifig, seine äußere Häßlichkeit zu eklatant, als daß er das Leben taktvoll zu beherrschen vermöchte.

...

Der Mann ist ein Zwischenglied zwischen Mensch und Tier, denn er ist eine Spottgeburt und als solche derart zynisch und lächerlich ausgestattet, so daß er weder das eine noch das andere in voller Wirklichkeit sein kann.

Die Natur hat den Mann durch übermäßig auffallende Entwicklung seiner Genitalien eine Schlappe, ein Brandmal ohnegleichen aufgedrückt.

Die in der gesamten organischen Welt von seiten des männlichen Geschlechtes behauptete Superiorität der sexuellen Form ist bei dem Mann in doppelter Beziehung : 1. in Hinsicht auf den schönen Teil der Tierwelt, 2. auf seine weibliche Gefährtin total abhanden gekommen. Eher würden Ziege und Äffin als seine natürlichen Genossinnen genannt zu werden verdienen. Denn er ist grausig beschaffen und trägt sein schlumpumpenartiges Geschlechtszeichen wie ein Verbrecher voran. Die flache Brust, die häßliche Bartung mit ihren dicken Wülsten und fliegenden Haarsetzen, die im Gegensatz zu der geckenhaften Ausstattung der meisten Tiere einen niederen Charakter verrät, und endlich das durchschnittlich über alle Maßen abscheuliche und gemeine Stimmorgan, voll von urlaten und anstößigen Gurgeltönen, weisen ihm in Wahrheit eine sehr tiefe Stufe im Reiche der Lebewesen zu. Er scheint wie eine Spielart.

With regard to his constitution the male is unworthy of a spouse, a hindrance to marriage and not a binding spirit. He does not fit at all in the framework of a reasonable world. For he is too crude and deceitful, his thought is too full of gaps and digressions, his external ugliness is too striking, that he would be able to master life in a tactful manner. . . . The male is an intermediate stage between human being and animal; he is a monstrosity and as such cynically and ridiculously equipped so that

in full reality he is neither one nor the other.^{xi}

Druskowitz continues in this vein for several pages. Most male commentators have dismissed this sort of writing as a sign of her insanity, or as gibberish. At the same time, however, we might want to ask ourselves whether these observations differ significantly from several made by Nietzsche during the 1880s about women, except, of course, for the object of the deprecation.

Without bothering to answer this question, let me move to a second element of context that is important for an understanding of Nietzsche's relationship to the women's question, one that we might call a discursive context. Ignored by most writers on Nietzsche and women is the not inconsiderable discourse on the subjection and the emancipation of women in the late nineteenth century, in particular the male contributions to this discourse. There is no evidence that Nietzsche was particularly interested in the many writings women themselves produced on education, marriage, or their own subjection. But he did pay attention to the most forceful contemporary male advocate of women's rights: John Stuart Mill. Mill's seminal text *The Subjection of Women* appeared in 1869, the year in which Nietzsche assumed his professorship at Basel, and it became a topic of discussion in Germany almost immediately thereafter. In promoting the equality of women and opposing what he recognized as an "almost universal opinion,"^{xii} Mill was also contradicting some of Nietzsche's most cherished convictions. Mill regards the sexes as equal in intellectual capacity and abilities, but unequal through an unfortunate, retrograde, but correctable social order. The reason that inequality arose is explained through the difference in physical strength, which has now ceased to be a persuasive ground for its perseverance. The reason that inequality is maintained is explained by the persistence of institutions and mentalities that must now be altered for the good of society as a whole. Mill rejects the contention based on a simplistic view of biology that the natural vocation of women is to be wives and mothers, and considers the marriage contract to be little more than the means by which slavery for half of humanity has been institutionalized. He also repudiates as unproven arguments based on other pseudo-scientific principles, such as the size of the brain. In all fields of endeavor, Mill argues, women should be granted full and unequivocal equality: in commerce, in education, in professions. His is a plea of reason, as well as passion. He repeatedly emphasizes

the disparity between women's subjection and the exigencies of the contemporary world:

The social subordination of women thus stands out as an isolated fact in modern social institutions; a solitary breach of what has become their fundamental law; a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one thing of most universal interest.^{xiii}

This subjugation is not only untimely, but also amoral. Indeed, Mill claims at one point that "the moral regeneration of mankind will only really commence, when the most fundamental of the social relations is placed under the rule of equal justice."^{xiv} Mill thus situates the women's question at the center of cultural, legal, political, social, and ethical concerns. Women's emancipation is a necessity for the continued progress of the human race.

Nietzsche obviously disagreed with Mill on this point and on just about every other facet of his philosophical outlook. Although he never refers directly to *The Subjection of Women* (1869), we know from his occasional remarks that his regard for the Englishman was low, particularly with respect to moral philosophy. Mill represents an idealized ethics of equality and sympathy that runs counter to what Nietzsche propounds. That Nietzsche was directly acquainted with Mill's text on woman during the 1870s is unlikely; his knowledge of English was deficient, and there exist few English books in his library. But it is almost certain that he read the essay in the German translation of Mill's collected writings. *The Subjection of Women* was rendered into German as *Ueber Frauenemancipation* (On the Emancipation of Women) in 1880. The translator was a young medical student from Vienna named Sigmund Freud, who, although more sympathetic to Mill's views on equality and morality, felt, like the reader of his translation, Friedrich Nietzsche, that women are very different from men, and that nature had destined them for a role in the social order that is defined by their biology. In Nietzsche's copy of Mill's essay, which can be examined in his library in Weimar, one finds numerous marginal notations and underlinings, indicating that he had read this work quite carefully. He was particularly interested in passages that claimed inequality was a moral depravity for the more favored as well as the lower classes, that advocated a just equality replace

domination based on strength, and that downplayed the natural and putatively necessary subordination of women in society. Nietzsche's rejoinder to Mill, like his answer to many of his unidentified interlocutors of the nineteenth century, is abundantly clear in his writings of the 1880s.

Nietzsche was hardly alone among male German intellectuals in engaging Mill's arguments. Rather, as I have suggested, he was part of a much larger discourse that is often forgotten today. Allow me to mention only two of the male scholars who entered into the ongoing dialogue on the women's issue in a more direct and public fashion. Heinrich von Sybel, a noted historian and public figure in Nietzsche's time, delivered a lecture on the emancipation of women in 1870, "Ueber die Emancipation der Frauen," which was collected in a volume of occasional pieces and published in 1874.^{xv} He begins by stating that this general topic has aroused a great deal of attention in America, England, and Germany, and that although it comprises many different issues, emancipation is really a matter of equality before the law and is therefore a component of the general democratizing tendency of the times. While Sybel appears sympathetic to these tendencies, he simultaneously does not advocate, as Mill does, a universal notion of equality. His reasoning is familiar. By nature women are destined to become mothers and are thus occupied for at least two decades of their lives with the necessary tasks of reproduction and motherhood. Everything else follows from this elementary fact. Although he does not seem to oppose the integration of women into educational institutions, government, and business, he believes that such cases will be the exception, since women are both naturally disinclined to compete in these areas and disadvantaged when compared with men. Although girls have the same aptitude as boys, and can learn ancient languages with equal proficiency, nature dictates that their career trajectory should be in the home, and for this reason a different type of schooling is required. Finally, with regard to suffrage, Sybel argues that the married pair is one unified vote, and although he sees some justification for extending suffrage to single women and widows, who are apt to be more reasonable in their voting habits than, for example, stupid men, he asks whether it wouldn't make more sense to take the vote away from stupid men rather than extending it to all such women. Sybel's position is thus rather typical of the debate of the times: formally sympathetic to women's emancipation, it uses nature as an argument to counter Mill's impassioned plea for equality.

An alternative approach more favorable to women's rights can be found in Gustav Teichmüller's book *Ueber die Frauenemancipation (On Women's Emancipation)* from 1877. When Nietzsche arrived in Basel in 1869, Teichmüller was one of the two philosophy professors at the Swiss university. The chair he occupied had been established only in 1867; its first occupant was Wilhelm Dilthey, who left after a year. Teichmüller did not last much longer: in 1871 he accepted a position at Dorpat (Tartu), and Nietzsche applied unsuccessfully to become his successor, probably because he was simply lacking credentials in philosophy. Teichmüller, like Sybel, turns to the "burning question" of women's emancipation in the wake of Mill's essay. He criticizes the British philosopher for his lack of a scientific attitude towards the very questions he raises and endeavors to correct his errors by delineating quite precisely the concepts one needs to solve the women's question in a genuine philosophical manner. Teichmüller's text is pedantic and tedious, but in contrast to Sybel, Teichmüller ultimately concludes that we must reject the Aristotelian inequality of the sexes for a more Platonic and theoretical equality. He recognizes that on the biological level men and women have different functions in the procreation of the species. But he declares that these functions entail merely the mechanical or materialist level of existence, and that society has an interest in the free and unhindered development of all its members, regardless of sex. He therefore maintains that all professions should be open to women, concluding from this that all educational institutions should be similarly accessible to any qualified candidate.^{xvi}

It might come as something of a surprise that I have not mentioned another philosophical voice whose opinions on women may have appealed to Nietzsche: that of Arthur Schopenhauer. While we know that Nietzsche was familiar with some works by Sybel and Teichmüller,^{xvii} it is by no means certain that he knew their writings on women's emancipation, while it seems plausible that in his early years, when he was a voracious reader of Schopenhauer, he had the chance to read the notorious section "Ueber die Weiber" ("On Women") in *Parerga and Paralipomena*. In these passages Schopenhauer appears to advocate precisely the positions that Nietzsche would later assume. Continuing a long tradition of misogyny in a male dominated culture, he contends that women in general are inferior to men in all respects, from their physical stamina to their intelligence. In the human hierarchy he finds that they occupy a middle step between child and man, a contention, we

will recall, that Helene Druskowitz neatly reversed. Women for Schopenhauer are unsuitable for great intellectual achievement; although they have a superior capacity for compassion, they possess a weak faculty of reason, "an instinctive craftiness and an ineradicable penchant for lying" (*ihre instinkartige Verschlagenheit und ihr unvertilgbarer Hang zum Lügen*). For this reason women are viewed as innate deceivers, unfit for anything that has to do with justice and truth. The only reason that men bother with them at all is because men's instinct has been bemused by sexual drives. Marriage is to be avoided as a foolish halving of rights and doubling of duties.^{xviii}

Now the reason I do not consider Schopenhauer a part of the conversation in which Nietzsche participates, despite similarities in views and temperament, is not only because he developed his ideas about women in a somewhat different climate, a climate in which there was no vital women's movement, but also because his views do not appear to have exercised a significant influence on Nietzsche or on other writers dealing with women's issues in the 1870s and 1880s. With regard to Nietzsche, as we shall see, in his early writings, composed at a time when he was most thoroughly enthralled with Schopenhauer, his views on women are substantially different in tone and emphasis; while when he is least influenced by Schopenhauer, during the 1880s, he is more likely to write about women with a deprecatory rhetoric resembling Schopenhauer's. Nietzsche's views on women are thus less aptly described as the continuation of a dominant misogynist tradition than as a response to more immediate cultural, institutional, and individual contingencies.

Let me come then to my third and final contextualization: the personal and biographical. We should note first of all that initially Nietzsche's views on the women's question, like his views on most of the social issues of his time, stem almost exclusively from second-hand sources. Although, as we have seen, the last three decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the growth of a large and vocal women's movement in Germany and throughout Europe, there is no evidence that Nietzsche had any interest in the movement, its leaders, or the most important writings (with the exception of some of the intellectual women he knew. It is not that opportunity for personal contact was lacking. Just a few months before Nietzsche's arrival in Leipzig in October of 1865, the first congress of the General German Women's Association took place in that very same city. Like many of the earliest women's organizations, the Women's Association was particularly concerned with the poor range

of educational options for women,^{xix} and although Nietzsche too would reflect on education in his early writings (in particular in his lecture series "Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten" ("On the Future of our Educational Institutions"), which he delivered in 1872 in Basel), he apparently did not take note of the women's movement at this early point in his life. The central organ of the Women's Association, *New Roads (Neue Bahnen)*, continued to be published in Leipzig during Nietzsche's years as a student,^{xx} and Leipzig was generally known as one of the most active cities with regard to the women's movement. From the evidence we possess, however, Nietzsche took no notice of this aspect of Leipzig's culture. In his writings we find no references to the Women's Association or its leaders, or to publications dealing specifically with women's issues. It seems likely, therefore, that Nietzsche formed his initial opinions about women and issues of women's rights from two sources: his own experience with women, which includes both his early years in Naumburg and his university experiences (where he was unlikely to meet women except in non-university settings), and from the classical tradition that formed the basis of his university studies and his career as an academic.

Nietzsche's relationships with women were often conflict-laden and indicate a paradoxical and sometimes schizophrenic attitude toward those closest to him. His upbringing was unusual in that he lived during his early years in a household consisting exclusively of women. His relationship to his sister and his mother was highly charged emotionally: while Nietzsche tried to break away from everything that the small-town morality of Naumburg represented, he was never quite able to escape the shadow of the petty-bourgeoisie. The two women closest to him pampered him throughout much of his early life; from the correspondence we possess it is obvious that Nietzsche's career was the focal point for both women, and that they were willing to sacrifice their own comfort for his success. Nietzsche appears to have considered this attitude as normal as they did. But along with their devotion came an oppressive bondage, the resentment of which only occasionally breaks through to the surface. Although Nietzsche usually expressed loving feelings and concern for both women in his letters and continued to correspond with them until his mental breakdown (after which they cared for him until his death), the following remarks from *Ecce Homo* evidence the considerable anger he had accumulated toward them over the years:

When I look for my profoundest opposite, the incalculable pettiness of the instincts, I always find my mother and my sister to be related to such canaille would be a blasphemy against my divinity. The treatment I have received from my mother and my sister, up to the present moment, fills me with inexpressible horror. . . . I confess that the deepest objection to the 'Eternal Recurrence,' my real idea from the abyss, is always my mother and sister (EH 41-42).

These mixed emotions toward the women closest to him colored his relationship to other women and his thoughts about the role of women in his and any future social order. Indeed, if we believe Nietzsche's own writings, the image of a man's mother determines, as he writes in *Human, All Too Human*, "whether, in his dealings with women he respects or despises them or is in general indifferent to them" (HAH 150). Although we should refrain from dilettantish psychologizing, it is difficult to believe that Nietzsche's attitude toward women can be fully understood without accounting for his intense and ambivalent feelings he harbored toward his immediate family.

What makes many of Nietzsche's published remarks on women so odd, however, is that in certain instances during his life he validated a notion of women's equality that placed him ahead of many of his contemporaries. Although it was unusual for a woman to pursue a university education, he encouraged his sister Elisabeth to audit courses at the University of Leipzig,^{xxi} and I mentioned earlier that he supported the acceptance of a woman student at Basel at a rather early date. Evidently in his personal dealings with women throughout his life, he treated them with deference and politeness, which accounts perhaps for the fact that intellectually emancipated women tolerated him in spite of his deprecatory remarks in writing about their sex. We have already seen that among the women with whom Nietzsche had close relationships several were independent, non-traditional women. Although Lou Salomé has caused the most ink to be spilled, undoubtedly the most important of these was the woman who introduced Salomé to Nietzsche, Malwida von Meysenbug. Nietzsche met her first at the ground-breaking ceremony for Bayreuth in May of 1872, and their friendship lasted until the end of Nietzsche's sane life with only one brief period of estrangement.

Besides being a noted supporter of the women's movement of her time, Meysenbug was also something of a failed matchmaker for Nietzsche during the 1870s, and in general her circle of friends and acquaintances supplied Nietzsche with most of his social contacts other than those he had from the various universities with which he was associated. Her belief that women should be encouraged to develop themselves as autonomous individuals and her rejection of religion also brought her into contact with leading socialists of her time, including Giuseppe Mazzini and Alexander Herzen. Although by the time Nietzsche met her, she, like Wagner, whom she had met in the early 1860s, had already begun to exhibit more conservative proclivities. Their closeness and a remarkably good relationship notwithstanding, Malwida was evidently unable by her own example or argument to dissuade Nietzsche from his increasingly misogynist tendencies. Perhaps the chief paradox in Nietzsche's writings on the women's questions is that despite his personal acquaintance with, and preference for, several pioneering and exemplary independent women in the nineteenth century, he continued to hold and express views on women that were retrograde, even for his age.^{xxii}

There is a tendency to treat Nietzsche's works as a unity, to ignore the shifts in emphasis and changes of mind that are reflected in his writings. With regard to the women's question such a procedure leads to confusion since there is a rather substantial difference between his works written before *Zarathustra* and his texts of the mid and late 1880s. Most of his early remarks about women fall under the rubric of "life wisdom," i.e., comments that are more observations on current social mores than ontological distinctions between the sexes or polemical comments on social movements. Many of the aphorisms from *Human, All-Too-Human* through *Dawn* were written in the context of his own unsuccessful search for a stable relationship, in which he was assisted by Meysenbug. In *Human, All-Too-Human*, for example, Nietzsche includes a heading "Weib und Kind" ("Woman and Child") (HAH 150-60) as one of several sections devoted to human interactions. Many aphorisms in this section are simply *bons mots* dealing with marriage and designed more for their display of wit than for philosophical reflection. Under the title "Diverse Sighs" Nietzsche writes: "Some men have sighed over the abduction of their wives, most however over the fact that no one wanted to abduct them" (HAH 151). In "Unity of Place and Action," an intentionally misplaced allusion to tragic theory, we read: "If married couples did not live together good marriages would be

more common" (HAH 151). Other aphorisms may strike us as good advice and be completely non-offensive:

Marriage as a long conversation. - When entering into a marriage one ought to ask oneself: do you believe you are going to enjoy talking with this woman up into your old age? Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time you are together will be devoted to conversation. (HAH 152)

Still other aphorisms distinguish men from women, but credit the latter with qualities that are unexpected from a traditional misogynist perspective, indicating that Nietzsche was certainly not under the sway of Schopenhauer. With regard to "female intellect" (*Der weibliche Intellekt*) Nietzsche maintains that women exhibit a "complete control and presence of mind and the utilization of every advantage" (HAH 153). They possess more reason than men, who are characterized rather by temperament and passion. That in marriage men seek a woman of temperament, while women search for a man of superior reason demonstrates only, according to Nietzsche, that they are both pursuing a partner that is the ideal of their own sex. Although Nietzsche retains the stereotype of the woman being more attached to persons than to things, thus explaining why women have a distorted relationship to politics and science, he adds in this rather conciliatory set of aphorisms: "Perhaps all this may change, but for the present that is how things are" (HAH 155). Nietzsche believes that the free spirits to which *Human, All-Too-Human* is dedicated will probably live without women (HAH 158), but his remarks here are devoid of the wholesale denigration of a Schopenhauer and of later comments in Nietzsche's own writings.

Nietzsche's relatively favorable remarks on women at the time of *Human, All-Too-Human*, in particular his fairly conciliatory comments on marriage, are quite different from the polemics we find in his later works. It is important to understand that these early aphorisms predate his largest disappointments with regard to women: not only his despair about finding a matrimonial partner, but also his disappointment with Lou Salomé and his partial estrangement from his sister very likely contributed to the types of remarks uttered in *Zarathustra*. From the early eighties onward we find

Nietzsche's opinions of women parroting in an alarming fashion the worst clichés from the misogynist cultural tradition of Europe. *Beyond Good and Evil* sets the dominant tone for much of the later work. Although women are likened to truth in the preface to that work, they are dissociated from it in the body of the text: "But they [woman] do not *want* truthCwhat do woman know about truth! From the beginning, nothing has been more alien to women, more repellent, more inimical than truthCtheir great art is the lie, their highest concern appearance and beauty" (BGE 125). Here the Schopenhauerian motif of women as deceivers, as shallow intellects, reappears in Nietzsche's works, combined with observations evidently directed against and prompted by the women's movement. The beginning of this aphorism makes clear that Nietzsche is responding to a movement for women's rights and equality, such as we have seen advocated by Mill and others: "Woman want to be autonomous, and to that end they have begun to enlighten men about 'women per se' Cthat is one of the worst signs of progress in Europe's overall *uglification*" (BGE 124). In Nietzsche's view, if women really established "female scientific thinking," it would reveal only that women are "pedantic, superficial, carping, pettily presumptuous, pettily unbridled, and immodest" (BGE 124). Enlightenment, even as it pertains to women, Nietzsche concludes, is a task for men.

Nietzsche's further comments in *Beyond Good and Evil* indicate clearly that he is participating in the discourse surrounding the European women's movement and its demands for justice and equality. In contrast to Schopenhauer, whose animosity is apparently without social grounding, Nietzsche's reflections on women, especially during the 1880s, reveal an opposition to the contemporary call for women's rights. Because relationships between men and women are characterized by "a most profound antagonism and the need for an eternal-hostile alertness," all talk of "equal rights, equal training, equal ambitions and obligations" is only a "*typical* sign of shallow-ness" (BGE 127). Indeed, the responsibility for such deplorable democratic tendencies lies ultimately with the men who have allowed women to feel justified in demanding any rights at all, and we must assume that Nietzsche has in mind not only Mill, but other, less noted proponents of women's emancipation such as Teichmüller. Since, in keeping with the "the democratic inclinations and basic taste," "the weaker sex" has been treated with such respect, women have "abused" the favorable situation by advancing further claims for equality (BGE 128). In the nineteenth century women have lost all

modesty, decorum, and fear of man. Nietzsche believes that women have gradually forfeited the advantages that they formerly possessed, that the progress they have experienced in terms of formal rights and privileges has been purchased with a decline in their natural femininity. With the demise of military and aristocratic cultures, in which Nietzsche evidently believes women exercised considerable influence with appropriate feminine means, women have become little more than clerks. The women's emancipation movement is thus paradoxically held responsible for a worsening of the situation of women:

Ever since the French Revolution, women's influence in Europe has *decreased* to the same extent that their rights and ambitions have increased; and thus the 'emancipation of women', in so far as women themselves (and not only shallow males) are demanding and encouraging it, turns out to be a curious symptom of increasing weakness and dullness in the most womanly instincts. There is *stupidity* in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity, which a truly womanly woman (who is always a clever woman) would have to be utterly ashamed of. (BGE 128)

The women's movement has been assisted in this "stupidity" by "idiotic woman-lovers and female-corrupters among scholarly asses of the male gender who are advising women to defeminize themselves in this way and to imitate all the stupidities that are infecting 'men' in Europe" (BGE 129). Nietzsche does not name any of these "idiotic friends" of the women's movement, but it is likely that he had in mind intellectuals like Mill or playwrights like Henrik Ibsen, who is taken to task in *Ecce Homo* for wanting to poison "naturalness" in sexual relations (EH 76). Although Nietzsche never mentions specific names or organizations, passages like these reveal that his remarks on the proper social role of women were developed in an antagonistic dialogue with the women's movement of his times.

The model role for women that Nietzsche prefers appears to be one in which they depend on their "natural" cunning and sensuality to secure social influence. As Zarathustra had stated, women should be a plaything for men (Z 178); in *Human, All-Too-Human* he had remarked that the

"shrewdness of women" is demonstrated by the fact that "everywhere they have known how to get themselves fed, like drones in the beehive" (HAH 154); and in *Beyond Good and Evil* we read that they have learned how to get men to keep, protect, and indulge them "like delicate, strangely wild, and often pleasant domestic animals" (BGE 129). In this relationship to men, which they are now, out of ignorance and deception, sacrificing for equal rights, they were not only better served, but potentially more powerful. Nietzsche is here propagating an image of aristocratic culture in which women exerted influence through their husbands; if the man was particularly weak and his wife particularly willful, then she could attain a commanding position in the social order. As in his general reflections, he is not concerned with the overall welfare of women as a group, but only of the ability of a select few, the highest specimens, to achieve greatness through apposite, gender-specific means. The worsening condition of women that he detects in his age is thus really a worsening for only those "higher types" of women—the "sensible," "well-reared" women—who knew how to use their wiles to their own advantage. The fate of women who associate with one of the "higher types" of men would perhaps be less fortunate. Nietzsche indicates that a "deep" man, "deep both in spirit and in desire, deep in a benevolence that is capable of rigour and harshness," regards women as "Orientals" do: he has to conceive of woman as a possession, as securable property, as something predetermined for service and completed in it. He has to rely on the tremendous reason of Asia, on Asia's superior instincts, as the Greeks once did" (BGE 127). Nietzsche is never explicit about a hierarchy of women's roles, but from his comments it appears that his opposition to "emancipation" is fueled in part by an animus against the leveling of women to one emancipated type and against the concomitant elimination of power for a properly feminine elite.

Nietzsche adds very little to his views on women and women's emancipation after *Beyond Good and Evil*—except perhaps for nuances and rhetoric. In the fifth book of *The Gay Science*, which was composed in 1887, he includes a section meant to deal with the divergent conceptions of love among men and women. As expected, his starting point is an assertion that equality or equal rights in the matter of love is neither possible nor desirable. In obvious opposition to the liberal and radical demands for equity, Nietzsche posits ontologically fixed ideals of men and women and their respective expectations in love relations.

What woman means by love is clear enough: total devotion [*Hingabe*] (not mere surrender [*Hingebung*]) with soul and body, without any consideration or reserve, rather with shame and horror at the thought of a devotion that might be subject to special clauses or conditions. In this absence of conditions her love is a faith; woman has no other faith. (GS 319)

Man desires precisely to secure this type of unconditional love from a woman. Those men who themselves manifest unconditional devotion assume an alien characteristic: "A man who loves like a woman becomes a slave; a woman who loves like a woman becomes a more perfect woman." Nietzsche thus takes a social and historical relationship and ontologizes it, making it part of human nature. In contrast to the women's movement, which was clamoring for rights, Nietzsche can then assert that "a woman's passion" consists in the "unconditional renunciation of rights of her own" and in the expectation that the man will exhibit no similar renunciation. While women were struggling to free themselves from their legal status as the property of their husbands, Nietzsche maintains that "woman wants to be taken and accepted as a possession, wants to be absorbed into the concept of possession, possessed." The conceptions that Nietzsche imputes to women are not socially conditioned, but biologically fixed. The attempts to evade biological destiny are doomed to failure: "I do not see how one can get around this natural opposition by means of social contracts or with the best will in the world to be just" (GS 319).^{xxiii} In keeping with tendencies found elsewhere in his later writings, biology is used here to reinforce social hierarchies and to oppose emancipatory movements. While in *Human, All-Too-Human* Nietzsche could envision an equality between men and women, in his later years he dismisses this potential as a violation of unalterable physiological constants.

Nietzsche's final and perhaps most ludicrous remarks about the Women's Question occur in *Ecce Homo*. Declaring himself the "first psychologist of the eternal womanly"^{xxiv} and the love-object of all woman, Nietzsche takes his parting shots at the movement trying to introduce equality between the sexes. Those who do not love him are "the abortive women, the 'emancipated' who lack the stuff

for children" (EH 75). Here Nietzsche employs the stereotypical defamation for women who resist men and demand equal rights: they are abnormal, not feminine, and unable to procreate. At the same time that he claims all women love him, he simultaneously demonstrates a deep contempt: a woman is a "dangerous, creeping, subterranean little beast of prey"; they are more wicked than men; those who are good are aberrant; "goodness in a woman is already a form of degeneration" (EH 76). True to his biologism of the later years Nietzsche attributes to the "beautiful soul," a Goethean ideal of woman, a physiological disadvantage and categorizes the struggle for equal rights as a "symptom of sickness." He reserves his most venomous remarks, however, for the notion of "emancipation of women." For Nietzsche this ill-advised slogan

is the instinctive hatred of the woman who has *turned out ill*, that is to say is incapable of bearing, for her who has turned out well. The struggle against 'man' is always only means, subterfuge, tactic. When they *elevate* themselves as 'woman in herself', as 'higher woman', as 'idealist' woman, they want to lower the general level of rank of woman; no surer means for achieving that than high school education, trousers and the political rights of voting cattle. At bottom the emancipated are the anarchists in the world of the 'eternal womanly', the underprivileged whose deepest instinct is revenge. (EH 76)

Amid this semi-insane raving of the near-mad philosopher, we can still glimpse the central motifs of his position on the Women's Question: the rejection of equality in politics and education, the destruction of hierarchy in the leveling of women, the natural, biological superiority of men, and therefore the futility of social emancipation. Nietzsche's solution to the Women's Question, like his solution to other social questions, lies in a hierarchical dystopia of the past projected into a future order. With these statements Nietzsche himself levels the subtleties and complexities that informed his views on women, as well as his early writings. His final legacy, articulated in an absolute rejection of modern values, unfortunately lacks the ambiguity that has otherwise made his philosophy so fascinating for subsequent generations. In his writings of the 1880s Nietzsche made

it difficult for emancipated women to subscribe to his thought; apparently, as recent trends in Nietzsche scholarship indicate, he did not make it quite hard enough.

Notes

i. In this essay Nietzsche's works will be cited from the following sources and abbreviated in the text as follows:

BGE ' *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by Marion Faber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

EH ' *Ecce Homo*, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1979).

GS ' *The Gay Science*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974).

HAH ' *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986).

KGB ' *Briefwechsel*. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975-1984).

SB ' *Sämtliche Briefe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich and Berlin: dtv and de Gruyter, 1975-84).

Z ' *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954), pp. 103-439.

Translations from the German texts are my own.

ii. The citation also contains a further complication if we consider a photograph taken in May of 1882, shortly before the composition of *Zarathustra*. In it we find Paul Rée and Nietzsche harnessed to a cart in which Lou Salomé is sitting; she is holding a whip in a raised right arm, as if she were about to strike the two men. The idea for this strange arrangement of persons and props was evidently Nietzsche's.

iii. I am thinking here of advocates of women's rights, such as the socialist Lily Braun or the pacifist Helene Stöcker. See Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 88-90.

iv. Lynne Tirrell, "A Sexual Dualism and Women's Self-Creation: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Nietzsche for Feminists," Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 199-224; here, 201.

v. This evidence appears in a letter written to Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast) in August of 1885, when Nietzsche asks his friend to send him a citation from Elisabeth Blackwell, to whom Bebel refers in his book *Woman in the Past, Present, and Future*, the original title of the volume commonly known as *Woman and Socialism*. We can conclude from this request that Nietzsche had probably read at least parts of Bebel, perhaps during the previous spring, when he had visited Köselitz in Venice. I should mention that Blackwell herself is an interesting figure for the women's movement in the United States and England, since she was not only the first woman to receive a medical degree in the United States (from Geneva Medical College, later Hobart College), but also the founder of the New York Infirmary in New York City (1857), a hospital staffed solely by women, as well as the

London School of Medicine for Women (1869). Significantly Nietzsche is totally uninterested in Bebel's socialist perspective and Blackwell's proto-feminism; what he remembers vaguely is a passage in which Blackwell (he recalls only her first name) speaks about the urgency of the sexual needs of women (SB 7: 86). Köselitz, cooperative as he always, produces the only two Blackwell citations from this early version of Bebel's text, but neither of them deal with the topic Nietzsche had recalled, and so he assumes that Nietzsche is referring to a passage in which Bebel writes about this topic without citing Blackwell. Coincidentally there is a passage in the expanded fiftieth edition of *Woman and Socialism* where Bebel cites Blackwell's remarks on the indispensability of sexual drives for the preservation of society, but this citation is taken from *Essays in Medical Sociology*, a text that appeared only in 1906, long after Nietzsche's death. Köselitz offers to send Nietzsche his copy of Bebel's work, adding the derogatory remark: "It can easily be dumped where the bookcase is deepest" (KGB 3.4: 51), but Nietzsche responds to the effect that he meant another citation by another woman, but that the whole matter is really not very important (SB 7: 94).

vi. When the Oberlin College opened in 1833 it stated its willingness to matriculate not only women, but men and women of all races in order to prepare them for appropriate positions in the work force. In its initial years Oberlin designed a Ladies' Department, which was evidently known as the "A female appendage." The educational enterprise was separate, but hardly equal, since women were asked to cook, sew, and wash for the men students; Mondays were without instruction in the Ladies' Department so that women could tend to their womanly duties vis-à-vis the leading sex." In 1837, however, women students, discontent with their segregated status, applied for and were granted admission to men's courses, and in 1841 Oberlin graduated three women who had completed the formerly all male course of instruction. Most progress for the academic woman in the United States occurred in the latter half of the century. Although there were some attempts to create women's colleges prior to the Civil War, the establishment of Vassar College in 1865, followed by Smith in 1871 and Wellesley in 1875 certainly marked a turning point in women's higher education. In the realm of co-education Ohio continued to play a leading role with the founding of Antioch College in 1857. Of the state universities Iowa was evidently the first to allow women to matriculate in 1855, although it apparently excluded them again in 1858. But the trend had already been established, and by the time the faculty senate at Berkeley recommended that "A Young Ladies" be admitted, eight state universities had already opened their doors, sometimes reluctantly and rarely very widely, to qualified women.

vii. Curt Paul Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Biographie*, 3 vols., 2nd rev. ed. (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1993), 1: 624-25.

viii. Janz 3: 305

ix. Her name is spelled variously; in SB it appears as Druscowicz; on at least one of her publications the editor makes her Avon Druskowitz."

x. It was about this time that Nietzsche also came to recognize that his quip about the whip may have incited some people against him. In a letter to his sister in July 1885 he expresses the hope that

Athe Zurich girls" will visit him in Sils-Maria, but that he has heard that he is considered a Aevil creature" in circles of women students: Ait appears,"he continues, Athat a certain allusion to an instrument that makes a snapping and smacking noise has had an enchanting effect" (SB 7: 65).

xi. Helene von Druskowitz, *Der Mann als logische und sittliche Unmöglichkeit und als Fluch der Welt: Pessimistische Kardinalsätze*, ed. Traute Hensch (Freiburg: Kore, 1988), 33-34.

xii. John Stuart Mill, AThe Subjection of Women," in Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman/The Subjection of Women* (London J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.: 1985), 220.

xiii. Mill, 237.

xiv. Mill, 311.

xv. Heinrich Von Sybel, AUeber die Emancipation der Frauen," *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Berlin: A. Hofmann & Co., 1874), 57-79.

xvi. Gustav Teichmüller, *Ueber die Frauenemancipation* (Dorpat: C. Mattiesen, 1877).

xvii. He mentions both men in his notebooks and correspondence.

xviii. See Arthur Schopenhauer, *Werke in zehn Bänden*, Züricher Ausgabe (Zurich: Diogenes, 1977), 10: 667-81. In this section we also find suggestions for legalized prostitution that come very close to Nietzsche suggestions, and that are proposed for similar reasons.

xix. See Jutta Menschik, *Geschichte Theorie Praxis Feminismus*: (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1977), 71.

xx. Elke Frederiksen, ed., *Die Frauenfrage in Deutschland 1865-1915* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), 448.

xxi. See H. F. Peters, *Zarathustra's Sister: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: Crown, 1977), 26.

xxii. A further aspect of Nietzsche's personal life that may have affected his views on women was his own sexuality. Recently Joachim Köhler has contended that Nietzsche was a practicing homosexual. See Joachim Köhler, *Zarathustras Geheimnis: Friedrich Nietzsches verschlüsselte Botschaft* (Nordlingen: Greno, 1989); parts of his thesis are also repeated in *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, trans. by Ronald Taylor (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998). While Köhler's claim rests on a great deal of speculation, it seems that Nietzsche's sexual life was at topic of discussion among the Wagners, and that Nietzsche was upset about Wagner's interference. See Janz, 1: 785-90.

xxiii. Nietzsche adds that it may be desirable .A.A. Anot to remind oneself constantly how harsh, terrible, enigmatic, and immoral this antagonism is," but he evidently believes that the traits about which he writes are so firmly implanted in the human being that they cannot be altered.

xxiv. The AEternal-Feminine" (*Ewig-Weibliche*), translated by Hollingdale as the Aeternal-womanly," refers of course to the final lines of Goethe's Faust.